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CRIMINAL RICO: FORFEITURE OF FEES, SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS, AND ATTORNEY RESPONSIBILITIES
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)1 is
the most expansive criminal statute ever passed by Congress.2 The stat-
ute and its amendments impose strict penalties for various activities asso-
ciated with organized crime, including forfeiture of the proceeds of crimi-
nal activity.3 However, RICO's ambiguous language has caused confusion
in its interpretation by federal courts.
Recently, differing interpretations by federal courts with regard to the
forfeiture provisions of RICO have become a major concern for attorneys
and their RICO clients. This comment will address RICO's general provi-
sions and amendments, the attorney's fee as a "forfeitable interest" under
RICO, and the constitutional and ethical concerns surrounding the attor-
ney-client relationship in a RICO proceeding.
I. RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT
A. General Provisions
In 1970, Congress enacted the original version of the Organized Crime
Control Act.4 In drafting RICO, the Senate Judiciary Committee in-
tended to eliminate "the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering
into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce ... by the
fashioning of new criminal and civil remedies and investigative
procedures."
5
RICO incorporates by reference numerous federal and state crimes
under the broad concept of "racketeering activity." 6 The statute provides
that anyone found to have committed any two of the incorporated of-
fenses within a ten-year period has undertaken a "pattern of racketeering
activity."7
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982).
2. See Atkinson, "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
68: Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1978).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 12, 28-29.
4. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 922, 941-48
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982)).
5. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(1982) (crimes enumerated include murder, kidnapping, gambling,
arson, and dealing in narcotics or other dangerous drugs).
7. See id. § 1961(5); see also United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 226-27 (3d Cir.)
(pattern of racketeering established by proof that defendant committed two or more predi-
cate offenses, which are specified illegal acts prohibited by state or federal law often associ-
ated with organized crime), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983).
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Section 1962 of the statute specifically prohibits the following four cat-
egories of activities by any person or by any organization: (1) using in-
come received, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity to acquire an interest in an enterprise;s (2) acquiring or maintaining
an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity;9 (3)
conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity;1" and (4) conspiring to commit any of the above offenses. 1 Sec-
tion 1963(a) of the statute provides that violations of section 1962 will
result not only in fines and/or imprisonment for convicted individuals,
but also in the forfeiture of any "interest" associated with the racketeer-
ing enterprise.1
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). For interpretation of section 1962(a) see United States v. McNary,
620 F.2d 621, 628-29 (7th Cir. 1980) (words "directly or indirectly" demonstrate that the
statute contemplates situations in which racketeering monies will not be directly or immedi-
ately employed to establish enterprise and thus, statute on its face does not require direct
use of illicit income to establish a violation of its terms), cert. denied sub nom. Caulle v.
United States, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b). A take-over of a legitimate enterprise through a pattern of racke-
teering activity is one form of misconduct punishable under this section. United States v.
Jacobson, 691 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1982) (defendant acquired control over bagel bakery
through collection of unlawful debt); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974)
(acquisition of interest in corporation through purchase of stock), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1105 (1975).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). For an interpretation of section 1962(c) see United States v.
Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980) (defendant conducts activities of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering when he is able to commit predicate offenses solely by
virtue of his position in, and control of, the enterprise, and predicate offenses are related to
activities of the enterprise), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981); see also United States v.
Melton, 689 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1982) (carrying out busiriess of construction company
through acts of insurance fraud, arson, mail fraud, and extortion), cert. denied sub nom.
Tillie v. United States, 469 U.S. 845 (1984); United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir.
1981) (RICO convictions based upon defendant's operation of drug enterprise out of night-
club owned by defendant), modified, 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 935
(1982); United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977) (convictions of majority share-
holders of corporation owning mobile home park operating illegal gambling operation out of
basement of modular home located in park reversed for failure to show that an enterprise's
interests were advanced), cert. denied sub nom. Helfee v. United States, 435 U.S. 951
(1978).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); see United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 1982)
(agreement to establish or participate in enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity is conspiring to commit a RICO offense), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983); United
States v. Palmeri, 630 F.2d 192, 200 (3d Cir. 1980) (overt acts committed in furtherance of
conspiracy need not be illegal to support conspiracy prosecution), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967
(1981). For an analysis of RICO's conspiracy element see Holderman, Reconciling RICO's
Conspiracy and "Group" Enterprise Concepts with Traditional Conspiracy Doctrine, 52 U.
CIN. L. REv. 385 (1983).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a). The defendant must forfeit:
(1) any interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962, and (2)
any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual right of any kind
affording a source of influence over, any enterprise which he has established, oper-
ated, controlled, conducted, participated in the conduct of, in violation of section
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B. Forfeiture Provisions
As a criminal penalty, forfeiture operates in personam. At early com-
mon law, such forfeitures wrested from the defendant the entirety of his
property rights upon conviction. 3 Before the enactment of RICO, in per-
sonam forfeiture was virtually unknown to the federal criminal law.1 4
Under the present statutory scheme, RICO forfeiture is imposed as a
punishment upon a finding of personal guilt in a criminal prosecution.' 5
Unlike common law forfeiture, however, RICO does not cause a forfeiture
of a defendant's entire estate, but rather a forfeiture of a specific property
interest in a criminal enterprise.' 6
The RICO forfeiture provisions were amended by the Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act of 1984 (Forfeiture Act).17 These amendments enlarged the
government's power to attack racketeering and were intended to clear up
ambiguities in the statute's interpretation with regard to the meaning of a
forfeitable "interest" and the rights of third parties who have received
forfeitable assets.' 8
II. FORFEITABLE INTERESTS UNDER RICO
A. Pre-Amendment Cases
Prior to the 1984 amendments, the opinions of the federal circuit courts
1962.
Id. For a general discussion on the courts' early interpretations of the RICO statute see
Comment, Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970: An Analysis of Issues
Arising in Its Interpretation, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 89 (1977).
13. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983); see United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d
952 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir.
1977), vacated, 439 U.S. 810 (1978), on remand aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 591 F.2d 278
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D.
Ga. 1979), aff'd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); United States v.
Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679 (D. Md. 1976).
14. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-90 (1974); United
States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1037-39 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980); see
also 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 68-71 (5th ed. 1942).
15. Huber, 603 F.2d at 396 (forfeiture is imposed directly on individual as part of a crimi-
nal prosecution, rather than in a separate proceeding in rem against property subject to
forfeiture). For an overview of criminal forfeiture see Comment, Criminal Forfeiture: At-
tacking the Economic Dimension of Organized Narcotics Trafficking, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 227
(1982).
16. Martino, 681 F.2d at 964 (Politz, J., dissenting); Rubin, 559 F.2d at 991 n.15; Thevis,
474 F. Supp. at 140-41.
17. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 3302, 98 Stat. 1837,
2040-44 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1963).
18. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-201, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3374-76.
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of appeal varied as to what property was subject to forfeiture under sec-
tion 1963(a). 19 Specifically, the courts disagreed as to whether or not prof-
its derived from illicit business enterprises were a forfeitable "interest."
The seventh circuit in United States v. McManigal, ° and the ninth cir-
cuit in United States v. Marubeni America Corp.,21 held that assets sub-
ject to forfeiture included only direct interests in a racketeering activity
and not the proceeds of that activity. In United States v. Martino, the
fifth circuit, sitting en banc, interpreted section 1963 more expansively to
allow for forfeiture of both the assets of the racketeering enterprise and
its proceeds. 22
In Russello v. United States,23 the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the fifth circuit's holding in Martino that profits constitute a for-
feitable interest under section 1963. The Court recognized that the forfei-
ture provisions of RICO as originally enacted were intended to have far-
reaching effects. The "statute was intended to provide new weapons of
unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and its eco-
nomic roots." 2
4
B. The 1984 Amendments
The 1984 amendments25 reiterate the far-reaching purpose of the RICO
19. See United States v. Jacobson, 691 F.2d 110, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1982) (RICO statute
covers property rights in leaseholds as well as interest in the enterprise); United States v.
McNary, 620 F.2d 621, 629 (7th Cir. 1980) (RICO forfeiture provision operates on an inter-
est in a travel service acquired with proceeds of illicit activities); United States v. Rubin,
559 F.2d 975, 992 (5th Cir. 1977) (forfeiture provisions reach elective union positions held
by defendant convicted under RICO), vacated, 439 U.S. 810 (1978), on remand aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 591 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979). For a general discus-
sion of property interests under RICO before the 1984 amendments see Reed & Gill, RICO
Forfeitures, Forfeitable "Interests," and Procedural Due Process, 62 N.C.L. REv. 57 (1983).
20. 708 F.2d 276, 283-87 (7th Cir.), vacated, 464 U.S. 979 (1983) (judgment vacated in
light of the holding in Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983)).
21. 611 F.2d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134,
142 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (forfeiture authorized by statute does not embrace the fruits of profits
derived from operation of an illicit enterprise), aff'd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 825 (1982).
22. 681 F.2d 952, 961 (5th Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.
16 (1983); see also Payden v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y.) (the government
may claim title to assets owned by third parties if the third party took possession with
knowledge that these assets came from racketeering activities), rev'd on other grounds, 767
F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
23. 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
24. Id. at 26. "The sponsors of RICO intended to give the Department of Justice a new
and effective tool in the war against organized crime. The intent of the sponsors, as reflected
in the legislative history, was to strike at racketeering methods and money that infiltrated
legitimate business. Taylor, Forfeiture Under 18 U.S.C. § 1963-RICO's Most Powerful
Weapon, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 379, 397 (1980).
25. See Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 302, 98 Stat. 1837,
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statute as recognized in Russello v. United States.2 The Forfeiture Act
leaves subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of section 1963, which provide for
penalties of fines, imprisonment and forfeiture of assets associated with
the racketeering enterprise, substantially the same. A new subsection,
(a)(3), which provides for forfeiture of direct or indirect proceeds of rack-
eteering activity,28 was added in response to pre-amendment cases. The
legislative history clearly indicates that under this new subsection, RICO
forfeitures reach the profits derived from racketeering enterprises.9 In
addition, the Forfeiture Act adds a new subsection, 1963(b), to define the
types of assets subject to forfeiture. 0
The majority of the newly enacted provisions relating to post-convic-
tion matters" deal with procedural aspects of a RICO forfeiture. These
new procedures provide for an entry of forfeiture of assets transferred to
third parties by the defendant upon the defendant's convictions and ver-
dicts of forfeiture.3 2 The burden then shifts to the third party to vacate
the forfeiture order.33 The third-party petitioner is provided an opportu-
nity to present his case at a post-conviction hearing.3 The amendments
provide that assets transferred to the third-party petitioner will not be
forfeited if (1) the petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that either his title to the property predated the violation, or (2) he
2040-44 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1963). The Act's legislative history indicates "that [p]rofit is
the motivation for. . .[racketeering and drug trafficking], and it is through economic power
that it is sustained and grows." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, 191, reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3374.
26. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. II 1984); see also supra note 12.
28. Id. § 1963(a)(3). The defendant shall forfeit "any property constituting, or derived
from, any proceeds which the person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering ac-
tivity or unlawful debt collection in violation of section 1962." Id.
29. "Clearly, if law enforcement efforts to combat racketeering and drug trafficking are to
be successful, they must include an attack on the economic aspects of these crimes." S. REP.
No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3182, 3374.
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b). This subsection adds no new substantive provisions, but only
clarifies earlier ambiguities in the statute. "[P]roperty subject to forfeiture under the RICO
statute may be either real property or tangible or intangible personal property . . . [this]
intent [is] consistent with current law, that the concept of "property" as used in section
1963 is to be broadly construed." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, 200, reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3182, 3383.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(f)-(j),(l),(m).
32. Id. § 1963(g).
33. Id. § 1963(m)(6).
34. This post-conviction hearing is provided to third parties because a forfeiture provision
that deprives innocent third parties of property may violate the due process clause. See
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 688-90 (1974); United States v.
United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719-22 (1971).
1987] 593
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
was a bona fide purchaser for value without knowledge that the assets
may have been illegally obtained, and thus subject to forfeiture.3 5
C. Are Attorney's Fees a Forfeitable Interest Under the RICO Statute?
A defendant confronted with a RICO indictment may transfer money
or property to an attorney, a third party, in an effort to retain the attor-
ney for his defense. Is an attorney, therefore, a third party whose fees are
subject to forfeiture within the meaning of the statute? A literal reading
of the third-party-forfeiture provision in the statute would seem to en-
compass the legal fee.36 An attorney hired to represent a defendant in a
trial for RICO violations seemingly does not fall within either of the two
exceptions which would allow him to vacate the forfeiture order. 37 An at-
torney's title to the property is unlikely to predate the alleged violations,
and the attorney does not qualify as a bona fide purchaser without notice
that the property may be subject to forfeiture.
In several recent decisions 8 federal district courts have expressed disa-
greement on the specific issue of forfeiture of attorney's fees. In Payden
v. United States,39 a defendant who was charged with organizing a con-
tinuing criminal enterprise sought to intervene to quash a subpoena du-
ces tecum requiring his defense counsel to appear before the grand jury
and disclose counsel's fee arrangement. The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York refused to quash the subpoena,
ruling that it did not violate the defendant's sixth amendment right to
counsel.4°
Although the issue of forfeiture of attorney's fees was not squarely
before the Payden court,41 the court addressed the issue because eventual
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m); see United States v. Mandel, 505 F. Supp. 189, 192 (D. Md. 1981)
(statutory scheme of forfeiture provisions does not violate innocent third party's constitu-
tional right to due process), affd sub noma. Appeal of Schwartz, 705 F.2d 445 (4th Cir. 1983).
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (Supp. II 1984); see also United States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d
476 (4th Cir. 1983) (property interests transferred to attorney as fee retained their character
as profits of illicit enterprise, where attorney was put on notice by indictment that defend-
ant's profits and property were subject to forfeiture), cert. denied sub noma. Bello v. United
States, 469 U.S. 837 (1984); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981) (restraining
order valid in order to keep defendant from transferring plane to attorney as payment be-
cause attorney had notice).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m); see supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Payden v.
United States, 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.
1985); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
39. 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
40. See Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 848; see also U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The right only
applies in criminal proceedings which result in imprisonment. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367
(1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). It is operative from the initiation of for-
mal adversary proceedings. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
41. Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 849 n.14.
594 [Vol. 21:589
CRIMINAL RICO
forfeiture of attorney's fees was the government's primary interest in ob-
taining the fee information.2 The Payden court decided that attorney's
fees are forfeitable upon conviction, because the indictment of a defend-
ant for a RICO violation constitutes notice to the attorney that the de-
fendant's assets are subject to forfeiture.43
The opinions in United States v. Rogers,4 4 and United States v.
Badalamenti45 directly conflict with Payden. In Rogers, the defendants
were indicted by a grand jury for RICO violations.48 Contemporaneous
with the filing of the indictment, the government petitioned the court for
an order restraining the transfer of property.47 Counsel for the defendants
filed objections to the government's petition, and filed a motion to ex-
clude attorney's fees from forfeiture.48 The United States District Court
for Colorado denied the government's motion' 4 and granted the defend-
ant's motion to exclude attorney's fees on constitutional grounds.5 0
In Badalamenti,51 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York quashed a trial subpoena commanding a defense
lawyer to testify and produce fee-related documents at the trial of his
client52 Both of the crimes charged against the client, racketeering
(RICO) and conducting a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE),5 3 trig-
gered the operation of the comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984. Basing
its decision on the sixth amendment and the attorney-client privilege,54
42. Id. Anticipating an eventual indictment, Judge Edelstein of the New York district
court disagreed with the Colorado district court's decision in Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332,
which held that the government was not entitled to a preliminary order restraining attor-
ney's fees. In an opinion rendered subsequent to the Payden decision Judge Mathey of the
New York district court concluded that attorney's fees paid for legitimately rendered attor-
ney's services are not forfeitable under the RICO statute. United States v. lanniello, 644 F.
Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
43. Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 850 n.14.
44. 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
45. 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see infra note 56.
46. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1334.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1344-46 (the court denied the motion without prejudice to file an appropriate
motion for a preliminary injunction; the government must produce specific information sug-
gesting probability of success at trial).
50. Id. at 1351.
51. 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
52. Id. at 201. When a lawyer is called to testify against his client the lawyer may have an
obligation to withdraw from the case. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
5-102 (1983).
53. 21 U.S.C. § 848(2)(B) (1982).
54. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 198; see also United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp.
1308 (D. Md. 1986) (attorney's fees are not a forfeitable interest under the provisions of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 853 (1983), which
has forfeiture provisions identical to those of the RICO statute); United States v.
Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va. 1986) (attorney's fees are not a forfeitable interest
1987]
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the Badalamenti court agreed with the Rogers court and declared that
fees are not forfeitable as the proceeds of the client's alleged narcotics
and racketeering activities. 55
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND ETHICAL CONCERNS
A. Sixth Amendment Rights
The assistance of counsel is "one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amend-
ment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and
liberty . . . .The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition
that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not
'still be done.' "" The right to counsel attaches at the initiation of formal
judicial adversary proceedings, and continues through sentencing.5" Ap-
plication of the sixth amendment extends to all defendants in all federal
and state criminal prosecutions that result in imprisonment.,, The right
entitles a defendant, who establishes his indigency,59 to the assistance of
court-appointed counsel."0
under the provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21
U.S.C. §§ 853, 853(a) (1983), which has forfeiture provisions identical to those of the RICO
statute); United State v. Ianniello, 644 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (attorney's fees are not
a forfeitable interest under the RICO Statute). But see Brickey, Forfeiture of Attorney's
Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. Rav. 493
(1986) (checks on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion should prevent concern that for-
feitures of attorney's fees violate the right to counsel and undermine the defense attorney's
role in the adversary process).
55. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 198.
56. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938). The sixth amendment provides: "[iln all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance of Coun-
sel for his defence." U. S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (the sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right which
is binding upon the states). For a brief examination of the history of the sixth amendment
right to counsel and the Supreme Court's most recent limitation see Comment, Constitu-
tional Law-Criminal Law-Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel-Scott v. Illinois, 25
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 707 (1980).
57. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1969) (the right to counsel extends beyond trial and
extends to pretrial and post-trial stages of criminal proceedings where the defendant could
be prejudiced by the absence of counsel); Vela v. Estelle, 708 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1983) (right
to counsel in a criminal proceeding applies when substantial rights of the accused may be
affected, and therefore, the right extends to sentencing proceedings), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1053 (1984).
58. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25, 37 (1972) (defendant may not be imprisoned unless afforded the right to counsel); Ridg-
way v. Baker, 720 F.2d 1409, 1413 (5th Cir. 1983) (right to counsel turns on whether depri-
vation of liberty may result, not upon classification of proceedings as civil or criminal).
59. See United States v. Anderson, 567 F.2d 839, 840 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (if
financial condition is an issue at trial, defendant may prove indigency by presenting rele-
vant financial information to the judge in camera); cf. Asper v. Estelle, 709 F.2d 356, 357-58
(5th Cir. 1983) (defendant may prove indigency for appeal in forma pauperis by showing
nearly all available funds spent on trial); United States v. Harris, 707 F.2d 653, 659-61 (2d
Cir.) (standard for appointment of counsel under Criminal Justice Act is less than indigency
or destitution), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 997 (1983).
60. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342 (sixth and fourteenth amendments require appointment
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The sixth amendment requires that counsel provide "effective assis-
tance."'" Although the courts require that counsel perform with some rea-
sonable competence, most courts do not question tactical decisions and
trial strategies, 62 and will condemn only blatant errors.6 3 The United
States Supreme Court has specified only a few duties essential to effective
assistance: the duty to act as a vigorous advocate of the defendant's
cause; the duty to avoid conflict of interest;"' the duty to inform the de-
fendant of important developments in the course of prosecution; and the
duty to act with such skill and knowledge that the trial is rendered a
reliable adversarial process.6 5 These basic duties are not exhaustive and
courts must review the totality of the circumstances when reviewing
claims of ineffective counsel. 66
of counsel for indigent defendants in state courts); Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 463 (sixth amend-
ment requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in federal court); cf. United
States ex rel. George v. Lane, 718 F.2d 226, 231 (7th Cir. 1983) (offer of court appointed
counsel satisfies a state's constitutional obligation to provide defendant with legal
assistance).
61. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
62. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (strategic choices made after
thorough investigation are virtually unchallengable; strategic choices made after less thor-
ough investigation are reasonable to the extent that reasonable professional judgments sup-
port limitations on investigations); United States v. Leifried, 732 F.2d 388, 390 (4th Cir.
1984) (counsel's strategic decision to admit guilt on individual drug trafficking offenses and
to attempt to persuade jury of defendant's innocence of continuing criminal enterprise not
ineffective assistance).
63. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Cosey v. Wolff, 727 F.2d 656, 657-58 (7th Cir. 1984)
(counsel's rejection of proferred witnesses, two of whom had no reason to be biased toward
defendant, without interview or investigation was ineffective assistance), overruled by
United States v. Payne, 741 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1984); House v. Balkom, 725 F.2d 608, 617
(11th Cir.) (counsel's failure to investigate facts is unconscionable and falls below level of
performance by counsel required by the sixth amendment), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870
(1984); United States v. Winterhalder, 724 F.2d 109, 110 (10th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)
(counsel's failure to prosecute appeal after filing timely notice of appeal was ineffective
assistance).
64. See infra notes 95-97.
65. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The fourth circuit set forth similar criteria in Coles v.
Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968):
Counsel must confer with his client without undue delay and as often as necessary, to
advise him of his rights and to elicit matters of defense or to ascertain that potential
defenses are unavailable. Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both fac-
tual and legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed, and to allow
himself enough time for reflection and preparation for trial.
Id. at 226.
66. House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608, 615 (11th Cir.) in considering totality of circum-
stances, court looks to quality of assistance from the time of initial retention through the
time of appeal; seriousness of the charges must be considered in assessing counsel's perform-
ance), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984); United States v. Rusmisel, 716 F.2d 301, 305 (5th
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It is well established under the United States Constitution that a de-
fendant subject to criminal charges has a fundamental right to counsel in
judicial proceedings against him.6 7 A defendant charged with a criminal
violation under the RICO statute6 8 is equally entitled to that same funda-
mental right to counsel afforded all criminal defendants.
B. The Courts' Sixth Amendment Analysis
In ascertaining congressional intent of the forfeiture provisions, the
court in United States v. Badalamentill was of the opinion that Congress
could not have intended the broad language of the Act to apply to attor-
ney's fees.70 Such "a special application [is] . . . clearly at odds with an
accused defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right to have counsel to
defend the charge. '71
The courts in Badalamenti and United States v. Rogers72 specifically
addressed the issue of the forfeitability of attorney's fees upon conviction
of a defendant.73 In holding that attorney's fees are not forfeitable, the
Rogers court relied on the legislative history of amendments to the Com-
prehensive Forfeiture Act 4 and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Preven-
tion and Control Act." The Badalamenti court noted that the scant legis-
lative history of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, which was quickly
passed, produced "[n]othing of great value to the resolution [of the is-
Cir. 1983) (number, nature, and seriousness of charges, strength of prosecution's case,
strength and complexity of possible defenses, and severity of sentence faced by defendent
must all be considered in evaluating effective assistance claim); United States v. Zylstra, 713
F.2d 1332, 1338-39 (7th Cir.) (effectiveness of counsel considered in view of totality of cir-
cumstances; counsel's strategy of stipulating to allegations of activities of other members of
conspiracy and of not interviewing witnesses who did not seem to have helpful information
were legitimate tactical strategies constituting effective assistance), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
965 (1983); Martin v. Maggio, 711 F.2d 1273, 1280 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (seriousness
of charges must be considered in totality of circumstances when ruling on ineffective assis-
tance claim), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984).
67. See supra notes 56-60.
68. For elements of a RICO violation, see supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
69. 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
70. Id. at 197. The legislative history of the Act is vague, making Congress' intent difficult
to ascertain. The Act was so quickly passed that not all of the Act's pages were included in
the copy provided to the President for his signature. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp.
1332, 1336 (D. Colo. 1985).
71. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 197; see also Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1348-49.
72. 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
73. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
74. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1346-48 (construing the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, amending forfeiture provisions under the RICO
statute and the Comprehensive Drug Penalty Act).
75. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1346-48 (construing the Comprehensive Drug Penalty Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, amending 21 U.S.C. §§ 821, 824, 851, 854, 881 (1983)).
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sue]. ' ' 76 The Badalamenti court then agreed with the Rogers decision,
noting a House Judiciary Committee Report on the Comprehensive Drug
Penalty Act, which stated, "Nothing in this section is intended to inter-
fere with a person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel."
77
The issue of forfeitability of attorney's fees was not specifically before
the court in Payden v. United States.78 The Payden court, however, cited
the next sentence of the same Judiciary Committee report in an attempt
to rebut the declaration that forfeiture provisions were not intended to
interfere with a defendant's sixth amendment rights.79 "The Committee
* , * does not resolve the conflict in district court opinions on the use of
restraining orders that impinge on a person's right to retain counsel in a
criminal case."' 0 The Payden court thus reasoned that "Congress in-
tended, not to resolve the sixth amendment conflict through this legisla-
tion, but to leave the resolution of these issues to the courts."81
The Badalamenti court disagreed with the Payden court's interpreta-
tion of Congressional intent.8 2 According to the court in Badalamenti, the
sentence which the Payden court uses to justify its opinion that attor-
ney's fees are forfeitable does not address the constitutionality of forfei-
ture of attorney's fees.8 3 The Badalamenti court reasoned that this sen-
tence addresses the entirely separate issue of the constitutionality of
subjecting an accused's funds to a restraining order.8 4
The problem of having funds initially unavailable due to a restraining
order 5 is distinct from the problem of subsequent forfeiture of attorney's
76. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 197.
77. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 19 n.1 (1984)).
78. 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985); see
supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
79. Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 849-50 n.14.
80. See H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1, at 19 n.1 (1984).
81. Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 850 n.14.
82. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 197. Badalamenti and Payden were both decided
before the federal district court for the Southern District of New York. The Badalamenti
court, however, was in a position to disagree with the Payden court's opinion that attorney's
fees are forfeitable since the specific issue was not before the Payden court. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. A conflict exists in the district courts with regard to the issuance of restraining
orders to "freeze" a defendant's assets, thereby making it difficult to pay an attorney a
retainer. Compare United States v. Meinster, 488 F. Supp. 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (court ap-
proved post-indictment transfer of assets to defendant's retained counsel), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1136 (1982) and United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679, 682 (D.D.C. 1976) (court
denied restraining order in particular circumstances) with United States v. Bello, 470 F.
Supp. 723, 725 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (court approved restraining order because appointed counsel
available). The constitutionality of the use of restraining orders to "freeze" a defendant's
assets before trial is beyond the scope of this comment.
85. A wealthy defendant who is subject to a restraining order cannot be considered indi-
gent since he is not deprived of control over his property. See BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY
1108 (3d ed. 1969) (restraining order has no effect other than preserving the status quo until
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fees. A RICO defendant's problem is not the inability to pay a legal fee,
but that lawyers will refuse to accept a retainer that may later be for-
feited."' The Badalamenti court stated:
The problem is the unlikelihood of obtaining a lawyer at all, if the lawyer
will incur forfeiture of his fee upon the client's conviction. The Government
argues that forfeiture will be denied if the money is clean.87 This is true, but
irrelevant. The right to counsel belongs to guilty defendants as well as inno-
cent ones. 8
The right to effective assistance of counsel entitles every criminal de-
fendant a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.89 If the forfeiture
provisions apply to attorney's fees, a criminal defendant in a RICO prose-
cution has been effectively denied the assistance of an attorney, an essen-
tial tool for a proper defense.90 Therefore, the Badalamenti court con-
hearing upon application for a preliminary or temporary injunction); see also United States
v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1957) (restraining orders restricting defendant's assets so
that he could not hire an accountant to testify at a trial for tax violations are valid where
the defendant might be able to obtain funds from other sources such as bank loans), cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957).
86. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 197; see also supra notes 59-60. "The costs of mounting
a defense of an indictment under RICO are far beyond the resources or expertise of the
average federal public defender's office." Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349. The consequences
are traditionally held unacceptable, according to Justice Black:
Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to
establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are
everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society.
Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire
the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses. That government
hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend
are the strongest indications of the widepsread belief that lawyers in criminal courts
are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not
be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid
great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials
before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This
noble ideal cannot be realized if the ... [person] charged with crime has to face his
accusers without a lawyer to assist him.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
87. Should an attorney have to act as judge before trial to determine if the money is
clean?
88. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 197-98 If the fee is forfeitable it is not likely that a
defendant will have any attorneys to "choose" from. A defendant has a right to choose his
own counsel. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (defendant is entitled to a fair op-
portunity to obtain the counsel of his choice). The right to choice of counsel, however, is not
absolute. United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1983).
89. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275 (1948).
90. For an examination of the elements critical to a criminal defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to counsel, see Project, Fourteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:




cluded that "the statute was not intended, and should not be construed
to reach bona fide fees charged by the attorney for the defense of the
criminal charge." 91 The court concluded that if the statute were so in-
tended, its application would run "afoul of the Sixth Amendment by ef-
fectively preventing the accused from exercising the right to counsel. '9 2
C. Ethical Considerations and the Sixth Amendment
In addition to constitutional problems, the issue of forfeitability of at-
torney's fees raises several ethical problems for an attorney hired to re-
present a RICO defendant. An attorney's affirmative duty to maintain a
high standard of integrity and competency in his profession93 may be
jeopardized by accepting employment from a RICO defendant. The ethi-
cal issues which should be of grave concern to RICO defense attorneys are
the attorney's affirmative duty to represent his client zealously, the dan-
ger of accepting a contingent fee in a criminal case, and intrusion into the
attorney-client privilege and client confidences and secrets.
1. The Duty to Represent a Client Zealously
An attorney has an affirmative duty to represent his client zealously.9'
A RICO defense case forces an attorney into a position of conflict. The
attorney's duty to be well informed on the subject of his client's case 95
may conflict with his interest in not learning facts that might endanger
his fee.99 If an attorney is to remain a bona fide purchaser under the For-
feiture Act he must not have knowledge that his fee is the proceeds of
illicit activity.9
7
If the attorney brings a proceeding to claim his fee as a third-party
petitioner," asserting he was "reasonably without cause to believe that
the property was subject to forfeiture," the evidence required to prove the
91. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 198.
92. Id.
93. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-1 (1983).
94. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101 (1983); People v. Woods, 117
Misc. 2d 1, -, 457 N.Y.S.2d 173, 175 (Dist. Ct. 1982) (an attorney cannot leave his client in
the middle of a matter when the client does not supply him with money, because his duty to
represent the client continues throughout the proceeding); see United States v. Ramey, 559
F. Supp. 60, 62 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (by accepting employment as counsel for defendant in a
criminal case, the attorney impliedly stipulates that he will zealously represent the client in
the matter until its conclusion); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
2-110(C)(1).
95. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR6-101.
96. See id. DR 5-101. A lawyer should refuse employment when his own interests may
impair his professional judgment (attorney's interest would be for preservation of fee while
client's interest is in preservation of assets). See supra text accompanying note 64.
97. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c), (m) (Supp. II 1984).
98. Id. § 1963(m); see also supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
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claim would consist primarily of privileged matter.9 9 If an attorney is, in
fact, without reasonable cause to suspect his client's property was subject
to forfeiture, this could raise serious questions with regard to his compe-
tence, since an attorney is obligated to exercise due diligence to inform
himself of all relevant facts in his client's case.100 Thus, there is a danger
that an attorney will represent a RICO defendant less zealously than a
defendant in any other type of case in order to protect his opportunity to
collect his fee.'0 1 If an attorney is guilty of less than zealous representa-
tion of his client, that client, in effect, has been deprived of his right to
competent and effective counsel.
2. Contingent Fees in a Criminal Case
The acceptance of a contingent fee in a criminal case is strictly forbid-
den.10 2 A contingent fee is an arrangement between attorney and client
whereby the attorney agrees to represent the client with compensation
dependent on a favorable verdict in a case.10 3 If a defendant is acquitted
he pays his attorney, and if a defendant is found guilty he does not pay
his attorney.
If an attorney agrees to represent a RICO defendant, and the defend-
ant is acquitted, the defendant's property will not be subject to a forfei-
ture order.1 0 4 An acquittal, therefore, leaves the defendant with sufficient
and unencumbered funds to pay his attorney. Upon payment of the attor-
ney's fee, however, the attorney may have accepted the equivalent of a
contingent fee in a criminal case. If the RICO defendant's fee is construed
as a contingent fee, the attorney has violated the prohibition on contin-
gent fee arrangements in criminal cases.105 If a defendant is found guilty,
and the forfeiture provisions of section 1963 apply to attorney's fees, then
the attorney's fee will be forfeited to the government.0 6 The attorney,
therefore, will receive no compensation for his work.
The forfeiture provisions of section 1963, if they apply to attorney's
fees, place an attorney in such a position that he cannot ethically or fi-
99. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348 (D. Colo 1985). Such threats of fu-
ture disclosure tend to have the present effect of chilling free and open communications
between attorneys and clients. Id.
100. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmLrrY DR 7-101 (1983).
101. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1348.
102. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(c) (1983); see also Peyton v.
Margiotti, 398 Pa. 86,---, 156 A.2d 865, 867-68 (1959) (contingent fees in criminal cases are
illegal and void as against public policy).
103. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 260 (3d ed. 1969).
104. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982).
105. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(c) (1983) (prohibits contin-
gent fee arrangements in criminal cases).
106. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963.
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nancially afford to accept a RICO case. From an ethical standpoint, it is
doubtful that many attorneys are willing to sacrifice their reputations by
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Furthermore, given the
complexity of RICO proceedings, chances are slim that a RICO defendant
will be able to acquire an attorney to work on his case free of charge.
10 7
Since a RICO defendant will not be able to find an attorney if the fee is
forfeitable, the defendant has been deprived of his sixth amendment right
to counsel.
3. The Attorney-Client Privilege
Confidences disclosed by a client to an attorney in the context of a legal
relationship are protected by the attorney-client privilege."0 8 The privi-
lege, however, protects only those disclosures necessary to obtain legal
advice. 10 9
A RICO defense attorney may encounter ethical problems involving the
attorney-client privilege. If an attorney is called to testify in a judicial
proceeding with regard to his client's identity or fee information, he may
be forced to incriminate his client.1 0 Absent "special circumstances," cli-
ent identity and fee information are not privileged."' A RICO proceed-
ing, however, should be considered a "special circumstance" in which fees
and client identity are privileged since this information is more sensitive
in RICO prosecutions than in other criminal prosecutions. This informa-
tion in a RICO case is essential to free and open communication between
the attorney and his client.1
2
In Shargel v. United States,"' the court refused to recognize a RICO
case as a "special circumstance." In Shargel, a RICO defense attorney
was served with a grand jury subpoena duces tecum requiring the attor-
ney to reveal fee information and property transfers involving his cli-
ent." The court interpreted the scope of the attorney-client privilege
strictly and held that the district court properly denied the motion to
107. See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Colo. 1985); see supra note
86.
108. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1983); see Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). For a general discussion of the attorney-client privilege and
constitutional implications see Note, Attorney-Client Communications of Criminal Defend-
ants: Evidentiary and Constitutional Protections, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 739 (1985).
109. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
110. See supra note 96.
111. This result follows from defining the privilege to encompass only those confidential
communications necessary to obtain legal advice. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637
(2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); cf. United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 783
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 752 (1944).
112. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
113. 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984).
114. Id. at 61-62.
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quash the subpoena."15 The court stated that identification of individuals
as clients of an attorney and revealing fee information neither disclosed
nor implied a confidential communication, and therefore were not
privileged. 116
However, several recent federal district court decisions indicate that
the attorney-client privilege may be interpreted more liberally to include
client identity and fee information in certain circumstances."' The courts
may recognize a RICO prosecution as a "special circumstance." Client
identity and fee information would possibly become privileged in a RICO
prosecution, since the amount of an attorney's fee may show the substan-
tial income element of a RICO offense." 8
In In re Grand Jury Matters,"' grand jury subpoenas were issued to
attorneys who, in state criminal prosecutions, were then serving as de-
fense counsel for the same persons the federal grand jury was investigat-
ing. The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court did
not exceed its discretion in finding the timing of the subpoenas to be in-
appropriate. 120 The language of the opinion indicates that the federal
courts may, in their discretion, recognize "special circumstances."1
1 2
'
The major concern expressed by the court was that requiring an attor-
ney to become a witness against his client may disqualify the attorney
from representing his client in possible federal proceedings, and may re-
quire the attorney to withdraw from the state criminal proceedings. 22
The court also expressed concern that testimony by the attorney against
his client may drive a wedge between attorney and client."23 A defendant
115. Id. at 65.
116. Id. at 63; see also In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir.
1983) (identity of client not within privilege), cert. denied sub noma. Durant v. United
States, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984); Osterhoudt v. United States, 722 F.2d 591, 593-94 (9th Cir.
1983) (information regarding fee arrangement not privileged); In re Application of Doe, 603
F. Supp. 1164, 1168 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (privilege did not preclude grand jury questioning
counsel).
117. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v.
Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
118. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982).
119. 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984).
120. Id. at 19 (the court feared that disclosure of information at the time the subpoenas
were issued might be detrimental to the defendant in a state court proceeding in progress at
the time).
121. Id. at 17. The grand jury's right to evidence is substantially limited only by express
constitutional, common-law, or statutory privileges and its powers are subject to the judge's
supervisory powers. Id.
122. Id; see also supra note 52.
123. Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d at 19; see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY EC 4-1 (1983) (a client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer




would be deprived of his attorney in the first instance, and have his attor-
ney-client relationship destroyed in the second instance. Each of these
situations seriously endangers a defendant's sixth amendment right to ef-
fective counsel. In its opinion, however, the court emphasized that a deci-
sion to disallow attorney testimony is a discretionary one to be deter-
mined on the facts of each case.124 The court may use its discretion, even
when trial is pending, to determine that the grand jury's right to what
would normally be unprivileged evidence outweighs the right of the de-
fense bar not to be disturbed.'25
The court in United States v. Badalamenti26 also adopted a less re-
strictive stance on the scope of the attorney-client privilege. 127 The court
held that the Government must show both relevance and need in order to
secure enforcement of a subpoena of the defendant's lawyer to obtain fee
information. 2 " In examining these two factors, the court decided that fee
information was relevant to satisfaction of the "substantial income" ele-
ment of a RICO offense, 2 9 but that the government could satisfy the
need element by less intrusive means.3 °
Therefore, the Badalamenti court quashed the subpoena and empha-
sized that in certain factual situations fee information should be pro-
tected. 31 "Here the subpoena was not served until ten months after the
return of the indictment and six months after [counsel's] appearance in a
case of gargantuan proportions. The loss to the defendant of his counsel
under these circumstances would have a vastly greater impact on his sixth
amendment rights."1 32 The court in Badalamenti appeared to recognize
that a RICO prosecution presents a novel situation which falls outside the
general rule that fee information is not privileged.
The opinions in In re Grand Jury Matters and Badalamenti emphasize
the importance of the attorney-client privilege in criminal cases. 3' This
privilege is so important that it should not be interfered with absent a
compelling reason.
124. Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d at 17.
125. Id. at 19.
126. 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
127. Id. at 199; see also supra notes 109, 111 and accompanying text (the attorney-client
privilege is strictly construed absent "special circumstances").
128. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 199.
129. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
130. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 199.
131. Id. at 201.
132. Id. at 198.
133. Other courts have also emphasized the importance of the privilege. See Roe v.
United States, 759 F.2d 968, 973 (2d Cir. 1985) (before an attorney may be called before a
grand jury the government must make a preliminary showing of relevance and reasonable
need); see also Application of Doe, 603 F. Supp. at 1164 (the court indicated its willingness
to allow an attorney to claim attorney-client privilege to refuse to disclose fee arrangements
to the grand jury in exceptional circumstances).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The problem of forfeiture of attorneys fees under RICO and its 1984
amendments presents clear conflicts between the language of the RICO
statute, attorney ethics, and the sixth amendment. These are not conflicts
Congress could have intended to create in drafting the statute."" The
sixth amendment right to counsel cannot be overridden by statute.'35 The
canons of attorney ethics 36 are established principles that are too impor-
tant to be overridden by statute.
As the RICO statute is presently written, the federal courts must bal-
ance each of these interests and rights and decide which is the most com-
pelling." 7 However, Congress must not allow the issue of forfeitability of
attorneys fees to be open to various interpretations by the federal courts.
In order to safeguard the principles of the legal profession and the sixth
amendment right to counsel, Congress must amend the RICO statute to
make it clear that attorney's fees cannot be a "forfeitable interest" under
the statute. A RICO defendant, guilty or innocent, will then be assured of
adequate representation in all jurisdictions, and the statute will accom-
plish its far-reaching purpose of eliminating the infiltration of organized
crime into legitimate business enterprises.138
Elizabeth E. Stanulis
134. See supra notes 5, 18 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 93-96, 99-102, 108 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 24.
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